Call Sign Extortion 17 Read online

  A senior Navy JAG officer, Captain Al Rudy, long since retired, once said, “The mark of a good lawyer isn’t his ability to give all the answers, but rather, to ask all the right questions.”

  The following chapters scrutinize the evidence from the Colt Report and other sources, including autopsies, witnesses, credible press reports, and the House National Security Subcommittee’s February 2014 hearing on Extortion 17, exposing numerous contradictions and omissions that undermine the official story.

  Perhaps most important, as Captain Rudy once suggested all those years ago, this book will ask a lot of questions, questions the Colt investigation and the National Security Subcommittee of the House Oversight Committee should have asked, but failed to ask, questions that the families have demanded, and even a number of questions that the families haven’t demanded because they don’t yet know enough about the evidence to ask them.

  The preponderance of evidence points to the conclusion reported by the British press—that the Taliban was tipped off and knew where Extortion 17 was flying, and lay in wait, ready to ambush the chopper as it approached the landing zone.

  The evidence will also show that if pre-­suppression fire had been allowed by the American rules of engagement and had been employed, the thirty Americans on board Extortion 17 would still be alive today.

  Chapter 8

  The Colt Report 101: Points to Keep in Mind in Examining Evidence

  With two exceptions, the Colt Report never used real names. This was for security purposes and for the protection of the military personnel involved. If, for example, a Lieutenant John Doe from Pamlico was named in the report, that would potentially put a target on the back of the fictitious officer, making the officer or his/her family vulnerable to Al Qaeda or the Taliban. We can’t have that. (Excuse the irony here.) Therefore, the only proper names that appeared in the Colt Report were the names of Brigadier General Colt, the one-­star general conducting the investigation, and General James Mattis, the four-­star general who ordered the report.

  Everyone else identified in the Colt Report was identified by military acronyms. Those acronyms denote what job or mission the person speaking carried out. For example, on the night of the shoot-­down, two US Army helicopter gunships accompanied Extortion 17 into the landing zone. The pilots and flight officers from those Apaches were interviewed, under oath, about what they saw and what they knew in connection with the shoot-­down of the Chinook. However, the testimony of those witnesses (pilots and flight officers) did not include their actual names or ranks.

  The interpretation process isn’t that complicated; it’s sort of like reading the key of a map. Just as a map might have a star denoting the capital city of a state, there is an acronym for the pilots of the Apache helicopters who were interviewed (PB65BS). There’s another acronym for the co-­pilots (PB65FS) and still other acronyms for additional military personnel testifying.

  At first blush, some of the acronyms might look a bit strange for those not versed in military matters, and some are translated into layman’s terms to eliminate ambiguity as to who is speaking in the record.

  In many ways the Colt Report was extremely detailed, providing candid testimony from US military officers and enlisted members about the downing of the chopper, and showing detailed photographs and diagrams.

  In many other ways, however, the Colt Report was incredibly lacking, not even addressing areas critical to an accurate determination of what happened to Extortion 17, such as the blatant failure to pursue the identity of the Afghans who boarded that chopper without authority. The reason for this failure will be covered later in the book, and it has to do with General Mattis’s charging order to Brigadier General Colt, which, frankly, tied Colt’s hands in many ways.

  But for now, the Colt Report can be best understood, broadly, as both a wealth of crucial, detailed information about the crash and, at the same time, a big, black gaping hole, as if someone took a shovel and deliberately dug out crucial data and information absolutely essential to a determination of the truth, tossing that data into a secret abyss.

  These inexcusable gaping black holes in the report—including the failure to interview any Afghans familiar with the mission, the failure to even have a meaningful discussion about the identity of the seven unidentified Afghans who broke all protocol and entered the chopper moments before takeoff, and the failure to report on any forensics testing of small arms carried by those Afghans or by any of the SEALs—simply raise more questions and raise suspicion that the military was hiding something that if released, could prove highly embarrassing.

  This leads to another question: How did the Colt Report get out of the hands of the military to begin with?

  What really happened remains unclear. By stark contrast to the wealth of information provided in the Colt Report, as of early 2014, virtually no inside information had yet been released by the government on the Benghazi terror attack. In a conversation between an Extortion 17 parent and Mr. Charles Woods, the father of former Navy SEAL Tyrone Woods, who along with former SEAL Glen Doherty was murdered in Benghazi attempting to defend Ambassador Chris Stevens against a mob that greatly outnumbered them, Mr. Woods is reported to have said that the Benghazi families have, in contrast, received virtually no information from the government on what occurred.

  But in the case of Extortion 17, the Colt Report, originally classified as Secret, was declassified and given to various family members of the fallen SEAL team upon their requests by certain Navy officials.

  Once the report had been released, some high-­level officer apparently asked to get it back from several family members, but did not receive the families’ cooperation. As of early February of 2014, the report had been provided to the Washington Times, and to this author. However, before publication of this book, it still had not been widely disseminated nor analyzed.

  Chapter 9

  The Pink Elephant Escapes

  The biggest pink elephant in the room was the identity of the seven unidentified Afghans who rushed aboard the chopper prior to its shoot-­down.

  Flight Manifest Testimony

  A portion of the Colt Report transcript included testimony about the flight manifest, the official list of all personnel aboard the aircraft. Military regulations require the list to be accurate.

  In an interview conducted on August 15, 2011, nine days after the fatal crash, officers testifying under oath offered the Colt Report’s only glimpse into the key questions surrounding the seven unidentified Afghans in Exhibit 1, at page 118. Remember, as a roadmap has keys, so does the Colt Report.

  IO-­DEP was the deputy investigating officer, the principal officer assisting General Colt in the investigation of the shoot-­down. General Colt was the investigating officer. The deputy investigating officer was the guy doing a lot of the “heavy lifting,” so to speak, by asking a large number of questions on the record.

  JSOTF J3 was the joint/combined operations officer for the Joint Services Theater of Operations. This title was often shortened to “J3,” or the “operations officer.”

  JSOTF CDR was the commander for the Joint Services Theater of Operations. This officer was ranked above the JSOTF J3. Put another way, this officer was the J3 or the operations officer’s boss. This officer is also not specifically named in the report.

  Note how the operations officer (J3) brings up the topic of the unidentified Afghans, and note how quickly his boss, the JSOTF commander, cuts him off and changes the subject:

  IO-­DEP: Was there a manifest for that aircraft back at the—

  JSOTF J3 (Operations Officer): Yes, sir. And I’m sure you know by now the manifest was accurate with the exception of the [Afghan] personnel that were on. So the [Afghan] personnel, they were the incorrect—all seven names were incorrect. And I cannot talk to the back story of why, but—

  JSOTF CDR: But the bottom line is: We knew the total number that were
on the aircraft. We knew the total number that we were trying to account for on the ground.

  In the interest of full disclosure, the word “Afghan” had been redacted from the initial written report as shown above when originally released by the Navy to the families, perhaps to reduce the types of questions about be asked in this book and by others wanting answers. The word has been reinserted for our purposes here, to make the testimony easier to follow. But junior- and senior-­level US Navy and Army officials as well as others have repeatedly admitted to Extortion 17 family members that seven unidentified Afghans boarded the aircraft.

  Now in analyzing the portion of the testimony on the unidentified Afghans, note how the J3, the operations officer, basically said that the manifest was accurate except for the seven Afghans. The names were incorrect because seven other Afghans had been assigned for the mission, but were mysteriously switched out at the last second.

  Note too, how the JSOTF commander abruptly cut off the operations officer midsentence when the operations officer started talking about possible reasons for the switch-­out.

  Again, the operations officer said, “So the [Afghan] personnel, they were the incorrect—all seven names were incorrect. And I cannot talk to the back story of why, but—”

  The commander then cuts him off midstream, interjecting his own “but” midsentence, and goes on to give his “bottom line” analysis.

  JSOTF CDR: But the bottom line is: We knew the total number that were on the aircraft. We knew the total number that we were trying to account for on the ground.

  The commander clearly wanted no part of an extended conversation on the record about the Afghans, and immediately changed the subject.

  But the cat was now out of the bag, and the needle was now in the haystack. It would take a while before that needle—the fleeting reference to the Afghan infiltrators—was found, but later, with the help of a senior sergeant major in the US Army who cared about the truth and who apparently didn’t care much about political correctness, it would be found.

  Consider just how important the issue of passenger manifest accuracy is to the military. The requirement for accuracy is clear, as set forth in the Defense Department Transportation Regulation of October 15, 2012.

  Consider first the mandated requirement set forth in Paragraph J, entitled PREPARATION AND USE OF DD FORM 2131, PASSENGER MANIFEST. The Defense Department’s instructions are clear, and set forth as follows:

  J. PREPARATION AND USE OF DD FORM 2131, PASSENGER MANIFEST

  1. Use the DD Form 2131, Passenger Manifest, Figure V-21, to list the names of the deploying personnel. Units may use a typed list in place of the DD Form 2131 if the form is not available.

  However, the typed list must include all the information required on the DD Form 2131. The troop commander signs the anti-­hijacking statement (shown below) on the passenger manifest, regardless of the form used.

  First off, we see from the above that the names of the deploying personnel must be listed.

  Looking down to Section J (2)(a), the requirement is even more specific. The troop commander is required to “Prepare Form 2131 as follows:” At paragraph “g,” the manifest must be completed as follows:

  g. Block 7: PASSENGER INFORMATION

  (1) Block 7a: NAME. Last, First, Middle name of passenger.

  (2) Block 7b: RANK. Military/DOD civilian passenger grade (e.g., 0-3, E-4, W-2, GS-11).

  (3) Block 7c: SSN. Enter Social Security Number of passenger.

  (4) Block 7d: STATUS. Enter status of each passenger (e.g., Active, Civilian, Guard/Reserve).

  (5) Block 7e: ULN. Enter ULN.

  (6) Block 7f: LINE NO. Enter Line Number. Defense Transportation Regulation – Part III 15 October 2012 Mobility III-­V-11.

  (7) Block 7g: SVC. Enter Service.

  (8) Block 7h: CHECKED BAGGAGE. Enter number of pieces of checked baggage and total weight.

  (9) Block 7i: CARRY-­ON WEIGHT. Enter weight of carry-­on baggage.

  (10) Block 7j: PAX WEIGHT. Enter actual weight of passenger.

  (11) Block 7k: EMERGENCY CONTACT INFORMATION. Enter Name (Last, First, Middle).

  (12) Block 7l: EMERGENCY CONTACT INFORMATION. Enter telephone number (Include area code).

  The Department of Defense very clearly requires not only the names of every member boarding a US military aircraft, but much more information, including twelve specific subcategories here alone.

  In addition, there is also a requirement that the commander sign an “anti-­hijacking statement,” as set forth in section J (1), requiring the commander to certify as follows:

  The troop commander signs the anti-­hijacking statement (shown below) on the passenger manifest, regardless of the form used.

  “I certify that no unauthorized weapons/ammunition/explosive devices, or other prohibited items are in the possession of those personnel for whom I am the designated manifesting representative or troop commander, and that their authorized weapons have been cleared.”

  Note that the anti-­hijacking statement requires a certification that no unauthorized weapons or explosives have been brought on the aircraft. Note also the certification that “their authorized weapons have been cleared.”

  Clearly, the manifest process and the manifest procedure is in place, to ensure flight security, and to ensure that no unauthorized persons or weapons enter the aircraft. The ultimate goal is to keep the aircraft and the American military personnel onboard secure.

  Why, then, did the task force commander change the subject when his subordinate was asked about the manifest, and when asked about the unidentified Afghans?

  Why is there no concerted effort in the Colt investigation to figure out who they were? Why shut this down and ignore it?

  Was the Army not concerned that the unidentified Afghans could have been Taliban infiltrators? Wasn’t the Army concerned about whether the unidentified Afghans brought unauthorized weapons aboard? The manifest requirement from the Department of Defense mandates a certification that “authorized weapons have been cleared.”

  Yet the Colt Report blew this off as if it was a nonissue. Why?

  Billy Vaughn and the Discovery of the Manifest Discrepancy

  Although the issue of the seven unidentified Afghans has never been substantively reported by the press, perhaps because they have not yet realized its importance, it was first discovered outside the confines of the military by Billy Vaughn, father of deceased Navy SEAL Aaron Vaughn.

  Mr. Vaughn discovered the issue in a review of the 1,250-page Colt Report when he read the very same passage at Page 118 of Exhibit 1 that is cited here. In other words, Mr. Vaughn discovered the “needle in the haystack.” But because so very little was said about the unidentified Afghans on the flight manifest in the transcript, he initially assumed that the presence of the Afghans on board must not have been significant.

  Mr. Vaughn first raised this issue with military officials on January 11, 2013, fifteen months after the shoot-­down, when he and his wife Karen were visited in their home by then-­Admiral William “Billy” McRaven, and the admiral’s senior enlisted advisor, a senior sergeant major in the Army.

  Both at the time of the Bin Laden raid and the Extortion 17 shoot-­down, Admiral McRaven was the commander of Joint Special Operations Command, a post he held until August 8, 2011. Only two days after the Extortion 17 incident, he was promoted to commander of US Special Operations Command, with that Command being headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida.

  In his position as commander of Joint Special Operations Command, McRaven ultimately oversaw and commanded the logistical operations of Operation Neptune Spear, and although he did not fly with that mission, he was often referred to as the “mastermind” of the mission that got Bin Laden.

  Both Operation Neptune Spear, the SEALs’ greatest triumph, and Extortion 17, the SEALs’ g
reatest tragedy, occurred on McRaven’s watch.

  As a result of his leadership both as commander of Joint Special Operations Command, and then as commander of Special Operations Command, and due to the fact that he was also a Navy SEAL, Admiral McRaven often had communications with family members of the fallen Navy SEALs of Extortion 17.

  On or about Friday, January 11, 2013, Admiral McRaven traveled to the Florida home of Billy and Karen Vaughn, parents of deceased SEAL Aaron Vaughn.

  During the meeting, Billy Vaughn mentioned that he had read in the transcript of the investigation that seven unidentified Afghans had boarded Extortion 17, and Mr. Vaughn casually made the comment that, “This must not be a big deal.”

  But the admiral’s aide, the sergeant major, spoke up and corrected Mr. Vaughn’s assumption. “Mr. Vaughn, it’s a very big deal. [Speaking of the unidentified Afghans infiltrating the aircraft.] Because it was passed over. It’s a very big deal. That should never happen.” The sergeant major then added, “In fact, after the crash, we had to notify the men we thought were on the chopper. We had to notify them and tell them their sons were okay.”

  The sergeant major, whose name is being withheld here for his own protection, was taking it upon himself to alert the Vaughns about a major issue that had been overlooked. His words were heard by both Billy and Karen Vaughn, and it is important to note, by Admiral McRaven, who was sitting in the Vaughns’ living room beside the sergeant major. According to the Vaughns, McRaven sat silently and did not say a word.

  The timing of this revelation was significant. The Vaughns were alerted to this breach as being “a very big deal” on January 11, 2013, some seventeen months after the shoot-­down. Up until this point, the military had been successful in keeping people’s attentions off the security break, in part because it was buried in a very brief exchange, at page 118, in which the subject was quickly changed.